Five Centuries of Global Transformation: A Chinese Perspective

Humanity is in the midst of a global upheaval, on a scale unseen in 500 years: namely, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, the rise of China and the Global South, and the resulting revolutionary transformation of the international landscape. Although the era of Western global dominance is often said to have lasted five centuries, precisely speaking this is an overstatement. In reality, Europe and the United States have occupied their positions as world hegemons for closer to 200 years, after reaching their initial stages of industrialisation. The first industrial revolution was a turning point in world history, significantly impacting the relationship between the West and the rest of the world. Today, the era of Western hegemony has run its course and a new world order is emerging, with China playing a major role in this development. This article explores how we arrived at the current global conjuncture examining the different stages in the relationship between China and the West.

Stage I: A Shifting Balance Between China and the West

The first encounter between China and Europe dates back to the era of naval exploration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which the Chinese navigator and diplomat Zheng He (1371–1433) embarked on his Voyages Down the Western Seas (郑和下西洋, Zhèng Hé xià xīyáng) (1405–1433), followed by the Portuguese and Spanish naval expeditions to Asia. From then on, China has established direct contact with Europe through ocean passages.

During this period China was ruled by the Ming dynasty (1388–1644), which adopted a worldview guided by the concept of tianxia (天下, tiānxià, ‘all under heaven’). This belief system generally categorised humanity into two major civilisations: the Chinese who worshipped heaven, or the sky, and the West which, broadly, worshipped gods in a monotheistic sense. It is important to note that, in this era, the Chinese had a broad conception of the West, considering it to encompass all the regions which expanded northwestward from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean Sea and then to the Atlantic coast, rather than the contemporary notion which is generally limited to of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. On the other hand, Chinese civilisation spread to the southeast, from the reaches of the Yellow River to the Yangtze River Basin onward to the coast. The two civilisations would meet at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which point there has been a complete world history to speak of. At the same time, however, tianxia put forward a universalist conception of the world, in which China and the West were considered to share the same ‘world island’. Separated by the ‘Onion Mountains’ (the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia), each civilisation was thought to have its own history, though there was not yet a unified world history, and each maintained, based on their own knowledge, the tianxia order at their respective ends of the world island.

Although the Ming dynasty discontinued its sea voyages after Zheng He’s seventh mission in 1433, some islands in the South Seas (南洋, nányáng, roughly corresponding to contemporary Southeast Asia) became incorporated into the imperial Chinese tributary system (朝贡, cháogòng). This constituted a major change in the tianxia order, compared with the prior Han (202 BCE–CE 9, 25–220 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties in which tribute was mainly received from states of the Western Regions (西域, xīyù, roughly corresponding to contemporary Central Asia). More importantly, this southeastward expansion opened a road into the seas for China, as Chinese people of the southeast coast migrated to the South Seas, and with them goods such as silk, porcelain, and tea entered the maritime trade system. Compared with the prosperous Tang and Song (960–1279) periods, overseas trade expanded, with the Jiangnan (江南, jiāngnán, ‘south of the Yangtze River’) economy, which was largely centred on exports, being particularly dynamic; consequently, industrialisation accelerated and China, for the first time, became the ‘factory of the world’.

European nations did not have the upper hand in their trade with China, however they offset their deficit with the silver that they mined in the newly conquered Americas. This silver flowed into China in large quantities and became a major trading currency, leading to the globalisation of silver. Meanwhile, the introduction of corn and sweet potato seeds, native to the Americas, to China contributed to the rapid growth of the nation’s population due to the suitability of these crops to harsh conditions.

However, China’s involvement in shaping a maritime-linked world order also brought about unexpected problems for the country; namely, an imbalance between its economy, which penetrated the maritime system, and its political and military institutions, which remained continental. This contradiction between the land and the sea produced significant tensions within China, eventually leading to the demise of the Ming dynasty. Border conflicts in the north and northeast required significant financial resources, however most of China’s wealth at that time came from maritime trade and was concentrated in the southeast. Consequently, education thrived in this coastal region, resulting in scholar-officials (士大夫, shìdàfū) from the southeast coming to dominate China’s political processes and prevent tax reforms to better distribute wealth – instead, the traditional tax system was strengthened, imposing larger burdens on the peasantry. These tensions would eventually come to a head; taxation weighed particularly heavily on northern peasants who mainly lived off farming, leading to their displacement and becoming migrants who eventually overthrew the Ming regime. At the same time, military resources in the north were insufficient, leading to the growing influence of Qing rebel forces in the northeast and their opportunistic advances to the south, culminating in the establishment of the Qing dynasty’s (1636–1912) rule over the entire country.

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The Qing dynasty originated among the Manchu people of northeast China, who had agricultural and nomadic cultural roots. As Qing forces marched southwards and founded their empire, they made great efforts to establish control over the regions flanking China from the west and north, an arc extending from the Mongolian Plateau to the Tianshan Mountains and to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. For thousands of years, these northwest regions were a source of political instability, with successive dynasties trying and failing to unify the whole of China. By integrating these areas into the Chinese state, the Qing dynasty was thus able to achieve this historic political aim of unification. This domestic integration also had an impact on China’s international position, with Russia now becoming the country’s most important neighbour as the overland Silk Road was rerouted northwards, via the Mongolian steppe, through Russia to northern Europe.

By the mid-to-late eighteenth century, these two ‘arcs’ of development, on the land and sea respectively, held equal weight but differing significance for China: the land provided security, while the seas were the source of vitality. However, both the land and sea developments contained contradictory dynamics: the regions of the northwestern steppe were not very stable internally while relations with neighbouring Russia and the Islamic world remained stable, on the other hand, the southeastern seas were stable internally but introduced new challenges for China in the form of relations with Europe and the United States. These land-sea dynamics have historically presented China with unique trade-offs and, to this day, they remain a fundamental strategic issue.

In contrast, European countries benefited more from direct trade with China, and rose to a dominant position within the new global order.

During the sixteenth century, under the increasingly decadent Roman Catholic Church, ethnic nationalism brewed up in Europe, culminating in Martin Luther’s Reformation in Germany. Subsequently, Europe entered an era of nation-state building known as the early modern period, characterised by the break-up of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and the establishment of the sovereignty of secular monarchies, which overcame some of the hierarchies and divisions created by the feudal lords and made all subjects equal under the king’s law. The first country to achieve this was England, where Henry VIII banned the Church of England from paying annual tribute to the Papacy in 1533 and passed the Act of Supremacy the following year, establishing the king as the supreme head of the English Church which was made the state religion. This is why England is recognised as the first modern nation, while the constitutional changes were secondary.

The Roman Catholic Church, facing a ruling crisis, sought to open up new pastoral avenues, and began to preach outside of Europe through the voyages of ‘discovery’. Christianity gradually became a world religion, one of the most important developments in the last five centuries, with missionaries finally making their way to China, after many twists and turns, in the late sixteenth century.

The Christian missionaries had prepared to spread their message of truth to the Chinese, who they had expected to be ‘barbarians’. However, to their surprise, they discovered that China was a powerful civilisation with a sophisticated governance system and religious traditions. Although not believing in the personal gods of the missionaries, the Chinese people had a system of moral principles, a highly developed economy, and an established order. This inspired some missionaries to develop a serious appreciation for China, including translating Chinese classics and sending the texts back to Europe, where they would have a notable impact on the Enlightenment in Paris.

During the Enlightenment, Western philosophers developed ideas of humanism and rationalism, including notions that human beings are the subject and a ‘creator’ does not exist; humans should seek their own happiness instead of trying to ascend to the kingdom of God; humans can have sound moral beliefs and relations without relying on religion; the state can establish order without relying on religion; direct rule by the king over all subjects is the best political system, and so on. It is important to note, however, that these Enlightenment ideals, which are said to have formed the basis for Western modernity, had been common knowledge in China for thousands of years. As such, the flow of Chinese ideas and teachings to the West through Christian missionaries can be considered an important, if not the only, influence in the development of Western modernisation. Of course, the Western countries have been the main drivers of global modernisation over the last two centuries, but the modernity that it advocates has long been embedded in other cultures, including China. It is necessary to recognise and affirm this fact to understand the evolution of the world today.

In short, during the first stage of world history, which spanned more than 300 years from the early-to-mid fifteenth century to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, an integrated world system began to form, with both China and the West adjusting, changing, and benefiting in their interactions. From the Chinese perspective, this world order was largely fair.

Stage II: Reversals of Fortunes Between China and the West

In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Western countries utilised their higher levels of industrialisation to secure decisive military superiority, which they abused to conquer and colonise nearly the entire Global South. This brought the world closer together than ever before, but in a union that was unjust and, therefore, unsustainable.

Among the Western countries, England was the first to achieve an advanced stage of industrialisation, for which there was a special reason: colonisation. The British empire appropriated massive amounts of wealth from its colonies, which also served as captive markets for British manufactures. This wealth and market demand, along with England’s relatively small population, drove scientific and technological development, and ultimately industrialisation based on the mining of fossil fuels (namely, coal), and production of steel and machinery. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England would become the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world, with its wealth spreading to western Europe and its colonial settlements such as the United States and Australia. The thriving European powers violently conquered and colonised the outside world through military force including most of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, eventually reaching China’s doorstep in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. In the preceding centuries of peaceful trading with China, the Western powers accumulated a large trade deficit, which they now sought to balance through the opium trade. However, due to the severe social consequences of this drug trade, China outlawed the importation of opium in 1800; in response the Western powers launched two wars against China – the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860) – to violently open the country’s markets up. After China was defeated, various Western countries, including England, France, Germany, and the United States, forced China to sign unequal treaties granting these nations trade concessions and territories, including Hong Kong. As a result, the tianxia order began to crumble and China entered a period referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年国耻, bǎinián guóchǐ).

China’s setback was rooted in the long-standing imbalance between its marine-oriented economy and continental military-political system. First, China’s market relied heavily on foreign trade, but the Qing government failed to develop a sovereign monetary policy, resulting in the trade flow being constantly controlled by foreign powers. Silver from abroad became China’s de facto currency and, with the government unable to exercise effective supervision, the country lost monetary sovereignty and was vulnerable to the fluctuations of silver supplies, destabilising the economy. Second, China’s natural resources were over-exploited to produce large amounts of exports; as a result, the country’s ecological environment was severely damaged. Constrained by both market and resource limitations, China’s endogenous growth hit a chokepoint, as productivity plateaued, employment declined, and surplus populations became displaced, leading to a series of major rebellions in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. It was in this context that the West showed up at China’s doorstep.

Under the pressure of both domestic problems and external aggression, China embarked on the path of ‘learning from the outside world to defend against foreign intervention’ (师夷长技以制夷, shī yí zhǎng jì yǐ zhì yí), which has been fundamental theme of Chinese history over the past century or so. This formulation, despite having been ridiculed by many since the 1980s following the initiation of China’s economic reforms, epitomises the country’s strategy. On the one hand, China has closely studied the key drivers of Western power, namely industrial production, technological development, economic organisation, and military capability, as well as methods for social mobilisation based on the nation-state. On the other hand, China has sought to learn from other countries for the purpose of advancing its development, securing its independence, and building upon its own heritage.

Until the mid-twentieth century, however, this path did not yield significant changes for China, fundamentally due to its inadequate state capacity, which deteriorated even further after the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. In fact, several initiatives undertaken in the late Qing period to strengthen the state, generated new problems in turn; for example, the ‘New Army’ (新军, xīnjūn) which was established in the late-nineteenth century in an effort to modernise China’s military would turn into a secessionist force. Meanwhile, theories of development advocated by scholar-officials in this period, such as the concept of ‘national salvation through industry’ (实业救国, shíyè jiùguó), were impossible to implement due to the state’s inability to provide institutional support. As such, trade remained China’s fastest growing economic sector, which, despite bringing short-term economic benefits, resulted in China becoming further subordinated to the West.

However, by the time of the Second World War, which was preceded by China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945), the country’s international position began to improve, while the West experienced a relative decline. The Second World War and anti-colonial struggles for national liberation dealt a crushing blow to the old imperialist order, as the Western powers were forced to retreat, initiating a decline as they were no longer able to reap colonial dividends. Countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including China, won their independence; meanwhile, the Soviet Union, stretching across Eurasia, emerged as a significant rival to the West. Amid these global convulsions, China’s weight on the international stage dramatically increased and it became an important force.

In this global context, China began its journey toward national rejuvenation, with two main priorities. The first priority was political; emulating the Soviet Union, China’s Nationalist and the Communist parties established a strong state, which had been the cornerstone of Western economic development, while the lack of state organisation and mobilisation capacity was the greatest weakness of the Qing dynasty in the face of Western powers. The second priority was industrialisation, which advanced in a step by step manner in three phrases.

The first breakthrough in industrialisation took place after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and was made possible by the help of the Soviet Union, which exported a complete basic industrial system to China. Although this system had serious limitations, which came to a head by the 1970s and 1980s, it allowed China to develop a comprehensive understanding of the systematic nature of industry, especially the underlying structure of industrialisation, that is, heavy industry.

The second breakthrough in industrialisation came after China established diplomatic relations with the United States in the 1970s and began to import technologies from the US and European countries. During this phase, China focused on the development of its southeast coast, a region which had a longstanding history of rural commerce and industry. With the support of machinery and knowledge gained during the first round of industrialisation, the consumer goods sector in the southeast coastal areas was able to develop rapidly at the township level, the level of government which had the most flexibility. By absorbing a large amount of workers, the labour-intensive industrial system significantly improved livelihood for the people.

The third breakthrough in industrialisation, beginning at the turn of the century, was driven by the traditional emphasis for a strong state and a desire to continue the revolution, saw the government devote its capacity to building infrastructure and steering industrial development. As a result, China experienced continuous growth in industrial output and kept moving upwards along the industrial chain, creating the largest and most comprehensive manufacturing sector in the world. The global economic landscape thus changed dramatically.

Today, China is in the midst of its fourth breakthrough in industrialisation, which revolves around the application of information technology to industry. In the current period, the United States is worried about being overtaken by China, which has prompted a fundamental change in bilateral relations and ushered in an era of global change.

In short, at the heart of the second stage of world history were the shifting dynamics between China and the West. For more than 100 years since the early nineteenth century, the Western powers were on the upswing while China experienced a downturn; since the Second World War, however, the trends have reversed, with China on the rise and the West declining. Now it appears that the critical point in this relationship is approaching, where the two sides will reach equivalent positions, exhausting the limits of the old world order.

Stage III: The Decline of the US-Led Order

In the wake of China’s rise, the old, Western-dominated world order has been overwhelmed, however, the real trigger for its collapse is the instability resulting from the fact that the United States has been unable to secure the unipolar global dominance which it pursued after the end of the Cold War.

Historically, the Roman empire could not reach India, let alone venture beyond the Onion Mountains; in the other direction, the Han and Tang dynasties could have hardly maintained their power even if they had managed to cross this range. The structural equilibrium for the world is for nations to stay in balance, rather than be ruled by a single centre.

Even the immense technological advances in transportation and warfare have been unable to change this iron law. Prior to the Second World War, the Western powers had penetrated nearly all corners of the world; despite their competing interests and the force needed to maintain their colonies, this system of rule was, in a way, more stable than the current order by distributing power more broadly across the several countries. Meanwhile, in the postwar period, the Soviet Union and the West formed opposing Cold War blocs, with each camp having its own scope of influence and balanced, to an extent, by the other.

In contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower, dominating the entire world. The United States, as the most recently established Western country, the last ‘New World’ to be ‘discovered’ by the Europeans, and the most populous of these powers, was destined to be the final chapter in the West’s efforts to dominate the world. The United States confidently announced that their victory over the Soviet Union constituted ‘the end of history’. However, ambition cannot bypass the hard constraint of reality. Under the sole domination of the United States, the world order immediately became unstable and fragmented; the so-called Pax Americana was too short-lived to be written into the pages of history. After the brief ‘end of history’ euphoria under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama era saw the United States initiate a ‘strategic contraction’, seeking to unload its burdens of global rule one after another.

In addition to external costs, Washington’s fleeting pursuit of global hegemony also induced internal strains. Although the United States reaped many dividends from its imperial rule by developing a financial system in which capital could be globally allocated, this came with a cost; as a Chinese saying goes, ‘a blessing might be a misfortune in disguise’ (福兮祸所依, fú xī huò suǒ yī). The boom of the US financial sector, along with the volatile speculation that feeds off it, has caused the country to become deindustrialised, with the livelihoods of the working and middle classes bearing the brunt. Due to the self-protective measures of emerging countries such as China, it was impossible for this financial system to fully extract sufficient external gains to cover the domestic losses suffered by the popular classes due to deindustrialisation. Consequently, the US has developed extreme levels of income inequality, and become sharply polarised, with increasing division and antagonism between different classes and social groups.

Deindustrialisation is at the root of the US crisis. Western superpowers were able to tyrannise the world during the nineteenth century, including their bullying of China, mainly due to their industrial superiority, which allowed them produce the most powerful ships and cannons; deindustrialisation causes the supply of those ‘ships and cannons’ to become inadequate. Even the US military-industrial system has become fragmentary and excessively costly due to the decline of supporting industries. The US elite realises the gravity of this problem, but successive administrations have struggled to address the issue; Obama called for reindustrialisation but made no progress due to the deep impasse between Republicans and Democrats, a dynamic that inhibits effective government action, which Francis Fukuyama termed the ‘vetocracy’; Trump followed this up with the timely slogan ‘Make America Great Again’, promising to make the US the world’s strongest industrial power once more; and this intention can also be seen in the incumbent Biden administration’s push for the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act and other initiatives aimed at boosting domestic industrial development. However, as long as US finance capital can continue to take advantage of the global system to obtain high profits abroad, it cannot possibly return to domestic US industry and infrastructure. The United States would have to break the power of the financial magnates in order to revive its industry, but how could this even be possible?

In contrast to the deindustrialisation which has taken place in the United States, China is steadily advancing through its fourth breakthrough of industrialisation and rising towards the top of global manufacturing, relying on the solid foundation of a complete industrial chain. Fearing that they will be surpassed in terms of ‘hard power’, the US elite has declared China to be a ‘competitor’ and the nature of relations between the two countries has fundamentally changed.

The US elite have long referred to their country as the ‘City upon a Hill’, a Christian notion by which it is meant that the United States holds an exceptional status in the world and is a ‘beacon’ for other nations to follow. This deep-seated belief of superiority means that Washington cannot accept the ascendance of other nations or civilisations, such as China, which has been following its own path for thousands of years. China’s economic rise and, consequently, its growing influence in reshaping the US-led global order is nothing more than the world returning to a more balanced state; however, this is sacrilegious to Washington, comparable to the rejection of religious conversion for missionaries. It is clear that the US elite have exhausted their goodwill for China, are united in pursuing a hostile strategy against it, and will use all means to disrupt China’s development and influence on the world stage. Washington’s aggressive approach has, in turn, hardened the resolve of China to extricate itself from the confines of the US-led global system. Pax Americana will only allow China to develop in a manner which is subordinated to the rule of the United States, and so China has no choice but to take a new path and work to establish a new international order. This struggle between the United States and China is certain to dominate world headlines for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, there are several factors which decrease the likelihood that the struggle will develop in a catastrophic manner. First, the two countries are geographically separated by the Pacific ocean; and, second, although the United States is a maritime nation adept at offshore balancing, it is much less capable of launching land-based incursions, particularly against a country such as China which is a composite land-sea power with enormous strategic depth. As a result, US efforts to launch a full-scale war against China would be nonviable; even if Washington instigated a naval war in the Western Pacific, the odds would not be in its favour. On top of these two considerations, the United States is, in essence, a ‘commercial republic’ (the initial definition given for the country by one of its Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton), meaning that its actions are fundamentally based on cost-benefit calculations; China, on the contrary, is highly experienced in dealing with aggressive external forces. Altogether, these factors all but guarantee that a full-frontal war between the two countries can be entirely avoided.

In this regard, the shifting positions of China and the United States vary greatly from similar dynamics in the past, such as the evolving hegemony on the European continent in recent centuries. In the latter context, the narrow confines of Europe cannot allow for multiple major powers, whereas the vast Pacific Ocean certainly can. This situation constitutes the bottom line of the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, while China and the United States will compete on all fronts, as long as China continues to increase its economic and military strength and clearly demonstrates its willingness to use that power, the United States will retreat in the same rational manner as its former suzerain, Britain, did. Once the United States withdraws from East Asia and the Western Pacific, a new world order will begin to take shape.

Over the past few years, China’s efforts in this respect have paid off, causing some within the United States to recognise China’s power and determination, and adjust their strategy accordingly, pressuring allied countries to bear greater costs to uphold the Western-led order. Despite the posturing of the Western countries, there is, in fact, no such ‘alliance of democracies’; the US has always based its alliance system on common interests, of which the most important is to work together, not to advance any high-minded ideal, but to bleed other countries dry. Once these countries can no longer secure external profits together, they will have to compete with each other and their alliance system will promptly break up. In such a situation, the Western countries would return to a state similar to the period before the Second World War; fighting each other for survival rather than to carve the world into colonies. This battle of nations, although not necessarily through hot war, could cause the Western countries to backslide to their early modern state.

The willingness of the United States to do anything in its pursuit of profit, has led to the rapid crumbling of its value system. Since former President Woodrow Wilson led the country to its position as the leader of the world system, values have been at the core of the US appeal. At that time, Wilson held sway with many Chinese intellectuals, though disillusion soon followed; meanwhile, today, the myth of the ‘American dream’ and universal values of the United States remains charismatic to a considerable proportion of Chinese elites, however, the experience of the Trump presidency has torn the mask off these purported values. The United States has openly returned to the vulgarity and brutality of colonial conquest and westward expansion.

In addition, the current generation of Western elites suffers from a deficit in its capacity for strategic thinking. Many of the leading strategists and tacticians of the Cold War have now died, and amid hubris and dominance of the two decade ‘end of history’ era, the United States and European countries did not really produce a new generation of sharp intellectual figures. Consequently, in the face of their current dilemmas, the best that this generation of elites can offer is nothing more than repurposing old solutions and returning to the vulgarity of the colonial period.

This kind of vulgarity may be shocking to some, however it has deep roots in US history: from the Puritan colonists genocide against indigenous peoples in order to build their so-called ‘City upon a Hill’; to many of its founding fathers having been slave owners, who enshrined slavery in the Constitution; to the Federalist Papers which designed a complex system of separation of powers to guarantee freedom, but coldly discussed war and trade between countries; and to the country’s obsession with the right to bear arms, giving each person the right to kill in the name of freedom. Thus, we can see that Trump did not bring vulgarity to the United States, but only revealed the hidden tradition of the ‘commercial republic’ (it is worth noting that, in the Western tradition, merchants also tended to be plunderers and pirates).

Today, the United States has nearly completed this transformation of its identity: from a republic of values to a republic of commerce. This version of the country does not possess the united will to resume its position as leader of the world order, as evidenced by the strong and continued influence of the ‘America First’ rhetoric. The rising support among certain sections of the US population for such political vulgarity will encourage more politicians to follow this example.

The world order continues to be led by a number of powerful states, but is in the midst of great instability as efforts to strengthen the European Union have failed, Russia is likely to continue to decline, China is growing, Japan and South Korea lack real autonomy, and the United States, due to financial pressures, is rapidly shedding its responsibilities to support the network of post-war global multilateral institutions and alliances and instead seeks to build bilateral systems to maximise its specific interests. Put simply, the world order is falling apart; presently, the relevant questions are related to how rapid this breakdown will be, what an alternative new order should look like, and whether this new order can emerge and take effect in time to avoid widespread serious global instability.

China’s Role in Reshaping the World Order

A new international order has begun to emerge amid the disintegration of the old system. The main generative force in this dynamic is China, which is already the second largest economy in the world and is a civilisation that is distinct from the West.

China is one of the largest countries in the world and its long history has endowed it with experiences that are relevant to matters of global governance. With its immense size and diversity, China contains a world order within itself and has historically played a leading role in establishing a tianxia system that stretched over land and sea, from Central Asia to the South Seas. Alongside its rich history, China has also transformed itself into a modern country over the past century, having learned from Western experiences and its own tradition of modernity. By sharing the wisdom of its ancient history and the lessons of its modern development, China can play a constructive role in global efforts to address imbalances in the world order and build a new system in three major ways.

1. The restoration of balanced global development. The classical order on the ‘world island’ (世界岛, shì jiè daǒ, roughly corresponding to Eurasia) leaned toward the continental nations, while the modern world order has been largely dominated by Western maritime powers. As a result, the world island became fractured, with the former centre of civilisation becoming a site of chaos and unending wars. Pax Americana was unable to establish a stable form of rule over the world island, as the United States was separated from this region by the sea and was unable to form constructive relations with non-Western countries. Therefore, the United States was only able to maintain a maritime order, rather than a world order. It relied on brutal military interventions into the centre of the world island, hastily retreating after wreaking havoc and leaving the region in a perpetual state of rupture.

Conversely, China’s approach to the construction of a new international order is that of ‘listening to both sides and choosing the middle course’ (执两用中, zhí liǎng yòng zhōng). Historically, China successfully balanced the land and sea; during the Han and Tang dynasties, for instance, China accumulated experience in interacting with land-based civilisations, meanwhile, since the Song and Ming dynasties, China has been deeply involved in the maritime trade system. It is based on this historical experience that China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the most important aspect is the incorporation of the world island and the oceans, accommodating both the ancient and modern orders. The BRI offers a proposal to develop an integrated and balanced world system, with the ‘Belt’ aiming to restore order on the world island, while the ‘Road’ is oriented towards the order on the seas. Alongside this initiative, China has built corresponding institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

2. Moving beyond capitalism and promoting people-centred development. The system on which Western power and prosperity has been built is capitalism, rooted in European legacies of the merchant-marauder duality and colonial conquest, driven by the pursuit of monetary profits, managing capital with a monstrously developed financial system, and hinging on trade. Under capitalism, the Western powers have viewed countries of the Global South as ‘others’, treating them as hunting grounds for cheap resources or markets. Although the Western powers have been able to occupy and spread capitalism to much of the world, they have not been able to widely cultivate prosperity, too often tending towards malicious opportunism; for those countries that do not profit from colonialism, but suffer from its brutal oppression, the system is nonviable. As a result, since the Western powers took charge of the world in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of non-Western countries have been unable to attain industrial or modern development, a track record which disproves the purported universality of capitalism.

The ancient Chinese sages advocated for a socioeconomic model that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader in the 1911 revolution to overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the first president of the Republic of China, called the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’ (民生主义, mínshēng zhǔyì) which can be rephrased as ‘the philosophy of benefiting the people’ (厚生主义, Hòushēng zhǔyì). This philosophy, which values the production, utilisation, and distribution of material to allow people to live better and in a sustainable manner, dates back over 2000 years, appearing as early as the Book of Documents (尚书, shàngshū), an ancient Confucian text. Guided by this philosophy, a policy of ‘promoting the fundamental and suppressing the incidental’ (崇本抑末, chóngběn yìmò) was adopted in ancient China to orient commercial and financial activities towards production and people’s livelihood. Today, China has rejuvenated this model and begun to share it with other countries through the BRI, which has taken the approach of teaching others ‘how to fish’, emphasising the improvement of infrastructure and advancement of industrialisation.

China, which is now the world’s factory and continues to upgrade its industries, is also driving a reconfiguration of the world’s division of labour: upstream, accepting components produced by cutting-edge manufacturing in Western countries; downstream, transferring productive and manufacturing capacity to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. As the world’s largest consumer market, China should access energy from different parts of the world in a fair and even manner, and promote global policies which emphasise production (‘the fundamental’) and minimise financial speculation (‘the incidental’).

3. Towards a world of unity and diversity. When the European powers established the current world order, they generally pursued ‘homogenisation’, inclined to use violence to impose their system on other countries and inevitably creating enemies. The United States, influenced by Christian Puritanism, tends to believe in the uniformity of values, imposing its purported ‘universal values’ on the world, and denouncing any nation that differs from its conceptions as ‘evil’ and an enemy. During ‘the end of history’ period, this tendency was exemplified by the so-called War on Terror which launched invasions and missiles throughout the Middle East. Despite this preoccupation with homogenisation, the US-led order is being unravelled by rampant polarisation, broken apart by intensifying cultural and political divisions.

China, on the other hand, tells a different story. For millennia, based on the principle of ‘multiple gods united in one heaven’ or ‘one culture and multiple deisms’, various religious and ethnic groups have been integrated within China through the worship of heaven or the culture, thus developing the nation and the tianxia system of unity and diversity. Universal order or harmony can neither be attained through violent conquest nor through the preaching and imposition of values to change ‘the other’ into ‘self’, but rather by recognising the autonomy of ‘the other’; as emphasised in The Analects of Confucius (论语·季氏, lúnyǔ·jìshì), ‘…all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil’ (修文德以来之,既来之,则安之, xiūwén dé yǐlái zhī, jì lái zhī, zé ānzhī). By and large, it is along this path of harmony in diversity that China today conducts international relations.

China should understand the building of a new international order through the lens of revitalising the tianxia order, and its approach should be guided by the sages’ way of ‘harmonising all nations’ (协和万邦, xiéhé wànbāng) to pacify the tianxia. The process of constructing a new international order, or a revitalised tianxia order, should adhere to the following considerations:

1. A tianxia order will not be built at once but progressively. A Chinese idiom can be used to describe the China-led process of forming a new global system: ‘Although Zhou was an old country, the (favouring) appointment alighted on it recently’ (周虽旧邦,其命维新, zhōu suī jiù bāng, qí mìng wéixīn). Zhou was an old kingdom that was governed by moral edification; its influence gradually expanded, first to neighbouring states and then beyond, until two thirds of the tianxia paid allegiance to the kingdom and the existing Yin dynasty (c. 1600–1045 BCE) was replaced by the Zhou dynasty (c. 1045– 256 BCE). In approaching the construction of a new international order and revitalising the concept of tianxia, China should follow this progressive approach to avoiding a collision with the existing hegemonic system. The concept of tianxia refers to a historical process without end.

2. Virtue and propriety are the first priority in maintaining the emerging tianxia system. A tianxia system aims to ‘harmonise all nations’, not to establish closed alliances or demand homogeneity. China should promote morality, decency, and shared economic prosperity in relations between nations and international law. What distinguishes this approach from the existing system of international law is that, in addition to clarifying the rights and obligations of each party, it also emphasises building mutual affection and rapport between nations.

3. A tianxia order will not seek to monopolise the entire world. The world is too large to be effectively governed by any country alone. The sages understood this and so their tianxia order never attempted to expand all over the known world at the time, nor did later generations; for instance, Zheng He came across many nations during his voyages to the Western Seas, but the Ming dynasty did not colonise and conquer them, nor did he include them all in the tributary system, but instead allowed them to make their own choices. Today, China does not seek to impose any system onto other countries; with such moderation, the struggle for hegemony can be avoided.

4. A new international order will consist of several regional systems. Instead of a world system governed by one dominant country or a small group of powers, a new global order will likely be made up of several regional systems. Across the world, countries with common geographies, cultures, belief systems, and interests have already begun to form their own regional organisations, such as in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Atlantic states; China should focus on the Western Pacific and Eurasia.

The concept of regional systems shares some similarities with Samuel Huntington’s division of civilisations, however, importantly, it does not necessitate any clash between them. As a large country and land-sea power, China will likely overlap with multiple regional systems, including both maritime- and land-based regional systems. China, which literally means ‘the country of the middle’, should serve as a harmoniser between different regional systems and act to mitigate conflict and confrontation; in this way, a new international order of both unity and diversity can emerge.

A new architecture of global governance will be built gradually, with layers nested upon each other from the inside out. To this end, China’s efforts should begin in the innermost layer to which it belongs, East Asia. Traditionally, China, the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, Japan, and other countries in this region formed a Confucian cultural sphere; however, after the Second World War, despite these nations successfully modernising, relations between them have deteriorated due to the pressures of foreign powers, such as the United States and Soviet Union. China’s efforts to reorganise the world order must start from here, by revitalising this shared heritage, developing coordinated regional policies based on the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’, and demonstrating improved standards of prosperity and civility for the world. As the achievements and strength of such regional efforts grow, the power of the United States and its world order will inevitably fade out, and the process of global transformation will rapidly accelerate.

After the inner layer of East Asia, the next-most nested layer, or middle layer, that China should focus on is the heart of the world island, Eurasia. Central to these regional efforts is the SCO, in which China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are already member states, Iran and Afghanistan are observer states, and Turkey and Germany can be invited. Due to its economic decline and weakening global influence, Russia is likely to increase its focus on its neighbouring regions, namely Central Asia, and to participate more actively in the SCO, including assisting in efforts to promote harmonious relations and development in the region and minimising conflict. The stability of Eurasia is key, not only to the security and prosperity of China, particularly its western regions, but to overall global peace.

Finally, the outermost layer for China is the institutionalised BRI, which connects nations and regions across the world. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, to date China has signed more than 200 BRI cooperation agreements with 149 countries and 32 international organisations.

Concluding Remarks

The evolution and future direction of the world order cannot be understood without examining the shifting relationship between China and the West over the past five centuries. In the early modern era, the Western powers were inspired by China in their pursuit of modernisation; in the past century, China has learned from the West. The reemergence of China has shaken the foundations of the old Western-dominated world order and is a driving force in the formation of a new international system. Amid the momentous changes in the global landscape, it is necessary to recognise the strengths and limits of Western modernity, ideologies, and institutions, while also appreciating the Chinese tradition of modernity and its developments in the current era. For China, this requires a restructuring of its knowledge system, guided by a new vision which is inspired by classical Chinese wisdom: ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’ (中学为体,西学为用, Zhōngxué wèi tǐ, xīxué wèi yòng).


从中国视野看五百年世界大变局
本文原载《文化纵横》2018年第4期

人类正在经历五百年未有之大变局:欧美相对衰落,中国等非西方世界兴起,世界格局因此出现革命性变化。

不过,严格说来,言“五百年”之大变局,或许有点夸张。略加考察即可发现,欧美之强不过持续两百年而已,以其初步完成工业化为开端。

故五百年来之世界史,可以工业化为限,粗划为两阶段,其间中、西之势有较大变化。

西方今日已至其两百年强弩之末,新世界秩序已在构建之中,中国是主要塑造者。

世界史第一阶段:中西平衡,各得其所

名副其实的“世界历史”始于郑和下西洋,时当十五世纪初,略早于葡萄牙、西班牙人的大航海。随着中国与欧洲通过海洋通道直接联系,世界第一次连为一体。

本乎各自终极信念,人类文明约有两大类型:中国人敬天,中国以外各族群普遍信神,一神教是其较成熟者,是为广义的西方。

中国与西方共在“世界岛”,但葱岭(即帕米尔高原)隔绝中、西,各有其历史而无世界史。基于其既有知识,中国人、西方人在世界岛两端分别维护天下秩序和普世秩序。

广义西方演进之大势是向西、北移动,发端于从两河流域,然后到地中海周边,再到大西洋滨海,而有狭义的西方即欧美。

中国文明演进大势是逐渐向东、南移动,由黄河流域至于长江流域,以至于东南沿海,明太祖定都南京,即体现了这一趋势,由此必定经营海洋经济。

两者先后下海,人类文明两大类型直接相会于印太交汇处,此后则有完整世界历史可言。

郑和下西洋虽然中止,但一些南洋岛国进入朝贡秩序,此为天下秩序之重大变化,汉唐是以西域邦国为主的。

更重要的是,中国人下海之路已打通,东南沿海民众移民南洋,丝绸、瓷器、茶叶等货物进入海洋贸易体系。相比于唐宋时代,海外贸易规模扩大,江南经济在很大程度上围绕出口展开,其工业化进程加快,中国成为“世界工厂”。

欧人在中西贸易中不占优势,乃以其在新征服的美洲所开采之白银弥补逆差。白银大量流入中国,成为大宗交易货币。由此而有“白银全球化”。

原产于美洲的玉米、白薯种子陆续传入中国,适宜条件比较恶劣的土地,中国人口迅速增长。

然而,中国参与塑造海洋联结的世界秩序,给自己带来了意料之外的麻烦:中国经济已深入海洋体系,政治军事安排却仍是大陆体系,两者紧张、撕裂。

明朝即亡于海、陆间之紧张:中国边患在北方、东北,此为明成祖迁都北京之主要考量,而一旦迁都北京,国家战略重心转移,必然停止经营南洋;应对北方边患为国家财政重点,而当时财富多来自海洋贸易,集中于东南;

其地教育发达,东南士大夫得以主宰政治进程,为自身利益,阻碍税制调整,反而强化传统税制,强加于农民;以耕种为主业的北方农民负担沉重,沦为流民,转成流寇,最终颠覆明鼎;同时,北方军需供应不足,满清在东北日益坐大,趁机南下取天下。

满清成长于东北,长期与农耕、游牧两类文明区打交道,故南下立国之后,在南面治中原之外,积极经营“中国弧”地带,即在北、西两边环绕中国的蒙古高原、天山南北与青藏高原。

几千年来,在此地带此起彼伏的游牧民族不断进入中原,扰乱天下。满清在汉唐元明苦心经营的基础上,以复杂灵活的政治机制把西、北中国弧完整纳入中国政治体,初步解决了困扰中国四千年的大难题。

由此,国际格局也有改变:俄罗斯成为中国邻国,并最为紧要;陆上丝绸之路转而取道蒙古草原北上,经俄罗斯,终于北欧。

综合以上两大趋势可见,至十八世纪中后期,中国为海、陆两个弧面所合,两者分量相当,但对中国的作用不同:中国生机在海上,安全系于陆地。

西北草原弧内部不甚稳定,外接的俄罗斯和伊斯兰世界尚较传统;东南海洋弧内部稳定,外接的欧美有新因素涌现。中国涵摄海陆的格局在全世界大国中是独一无二的,其后至今,根本战略问题是权衡取舍者两者。

相对而言,欧洲从与中国的直接交往、也即从新世界秩序中受益更大。

进入十六世纪,罗马教会日益腐朽,欧洲民族-国家主义(nationalism)发酵,终由马丁•路德在日耳曼掀起宗教改革大潮。由此,欧洲进入国民-民族国家构建(nation-state building)时代,史称“早期现代”。

早期现代之历史主题是打破罗马教会一统权威,确立世俗王权之主权地位,此主权打破封建领主所造成的等级和分割,所有臣民在国王法律下平等。

最先取得成功的是英格兰,1533年,亨利八世禁止英格兰教会向教廷缴纳岁贡,次年通过《至尊法案》,确立国王为教会最高领袖,并以之为国教。英国被公认为第一个现代国家之理由在此,宪制变革则在从属地位。

面临统治危机的罗马教会寻求开辟新的灵牧场,乃沿大航海所发现的航路向欧洲以外传教,耶教逐渐成为世界性宗教,此为近五百年之大事件。十六世纪后期,传教士几经辗转,进入中国。

传教士本来准备向其想象中野蛮的中国人传播真理,但很快发现中国是高度文明的大国,中国政教之美超出其神学知识范围:中国人不信奉其所熟悉的人格神,却普遍有道德,有高度发达的经济和井然有序的秩序。有些人受到触动,乃转而认真对待中国,翻译中国经典,送回巴黎。

由此而有巴黎的启蒙运动。此前一千五百年,欧洲锁死在神教蒙昧中,即便中世纪重新发现古希腊哲学,也只作为神学的侍婢,用来证明人格神是存在的。

中国的国家及其思想则向西人展示了人生、秩序的另一可能,依西人关于现代一词的定义,中国文明自诞生起就是现代的。可以想见初次接触中学的西人之心灵震撼。

由此,西方哲人走上人文主义、理性主义,形成所谓现代观念和制度。启蒙哲人宣布:人是主体,没有造物主;人应求自身幸福,而非升入神的国;人完全可以不依神教而有健全道德和良好人际关系,国家完全可以不依神教而有良好秩序,国王直接统治全体臣民是最好的政治等等。西人在启蒙运动中所倡导的所谓现代观念和制度,在中国早已是几千年的常识。

故“中学西渐”大潮推动了西方的现代化,不可谓之唯一力量,但可谓之重要力量,中国思想启发了西方哲人或巩固了其苦思所得之灵感。

就现实表现看,西方是过去两百年全球现代化的主要推动者,但中国文化已内在其中,西人以其蛮力向全世界传播中国观念,当然是西方化的。认识和肯定这一点,才能理解今日世界演变之大势。

总之,在十五世纪初中期到十八世纪中后期三百多年的世界历史第一阶段,完整的世界初步形成,中国和西方在互动中皆有调整、变化,各有所得。从中国人角度看,如此世界秩序大体是公平的。

世界史第二阶段:中西之位的往复

十八世纪中后期,西方通过工业化获得军事优势,乃加以滥用,四处征服、殖民。世界固然因此而空前紧密地连为一体,但其秩序不公,因而最终难以持续,中国是重要的改变力量。

世界历史进入第二阶段的关键因素是西方实现工业化,中西之势的转移之源在此。

不过,细加分析即可发现,西方工业化多有得益于中国之处:在知识上,西人曾长期致力于思辨现实以外的存在,当其哲学转而肯定人为主体,则有“认识论转向”,转而面向现存之物,发展出分解-重构的方法,以之发现物之构造机理,进而运用技术手段制造人造物。

在制度上,启蒙哲人受中国启发而有“开明专制”观念,支持强大王权,西方乃超越古典城邦和教会政治,建立大范围国民-民族国家;又受重农学派等中国化思想影响,此国家重视工业生产,而传统上西方城邦多重贸易。

在西方各国中,英格兰率先推进工业化,则另有原因:殖民征服造就巨大海外市场需求,而英格兰人口有限,不能不寻找新技术;技术需求推动科学发展,科学、技术、工业良性互动,最终摸索到基于石化能源、钢铁机器生产的工业化之路。

英格兰率先富强,随后其技术、制度传如欧洲大陆。富强的欧洲列强凭其坚船利炮,对外征服、殖民。西方列强陆续征服非洲、中东、印度等地,终至中国门口。

西方在此前三百年与中国的和平通商中始终有巨额逆差,乃通过鸦片贸易弥补;遭中国抵制后则发动战争。中国遭遇失败,以中国为中心的普遍世界秩序——天下体系,趋于解体,被迫降格为民族国家,以救亡图存。

中国失败的原因主要在海洋型经济与大陆型军政体制的严重错位:第一,中国市场严重依赖海外,但政府未能及时转型,贸易流始终在他人控制下。

第二,海外白银流入为货币,政府未予有效管理,丧失货币主权,当其供应量波动时束手无策,经济无法正常运作。

第三,中国是世界工厂,产品大量出口,却未及时打开从外部获取资源的通道。以一国有限资源支撑世界工厂运转,资源过度开发,生态遭严重破坏。

受制于市场和资源的双重约束,中国的内生性增长遭遇瓶颈,生产率不再增长,就业机会减少,新增人口成为流民,终致十九世纪初中期连续发生流民大叛乱。西方人正在此时来到中国门口。

在内忧外患压力下,中国走上“师夷长技以制夷”之路,此为过去一百多年来中国历史之基本主题。八十年代以来很多人嘲笑这句话,但它确足以概括百多年来中国人之所为:

一方面学习西方之术,首先是军事技术,其次是支撑它的工业生产和组织技术,还有基于国民-民族国家的社会动员技术,此为西方力量所在,中国人努力学习之。另一方面,中国有悠久深厚的文明传统,学习目的始终是自强、自立。

到直到二十世纪中期的一百年,中国变化不大。根本原因仍在于国家能力低下,尤其是满清覆亡,本已低下的国家能力颓然解体,于是,晚清建设的某些现代机制反成祸乱之源,如新军堕落为分裂国家的力量。

晚清士大夫曾倡导“实业救国”,因为缺乏国家的制度支撑,根本无从展开。经济领域发展最快的仍为贸易,固然暂时带来经济好处,但长远而言,中国更深地沦为西方依附者。

到了以抗日战争为先导的二战时,中国国运终于开始上升,而西方则开始相对衰落:二战打垮老式帝国主义,原来统治全世界的西方列强退守本土,无从获得殖民红利,缓慢走上衰落之路。

包括中国在内的亚非拉国家实现独立自主。介乎欧亚之间的苏联崛起,与西方分庭抗礼;在两大阵营之间的中国的分量陡然加重,成为决定性第三方。

在此格局中,中国走上强国复兴之路:首先,政治上,国共两党共同学习苏联,终于建立强国家,西方经济发展是以此为基础的。满清面对西方列强的最大劣势就是国家组织力低下而缺乏动员能力。其次,工业化得以循序推进,可分为三个阶段:

工业化第一轮突破得益于苏联的帮助。面对中国,重贸易的欧美海洋国家主要看重中国的庞大市场,故与中国的关系始终浅尝辄止,随时可以退出。

苏联作为有野心的中国陆上邻国,当海洋国家欲控制中国时通常支持中国以抗衡之,晚清以来即是如此,五六十年代的支持力度最大,向中国输入全套工业体系。

此体系确有严重偏颇,故至七、八十年代陷入困境,但国人毕竟由此完整认识了工业的体系性,尤其触及工业化底层架构即能源和重工业,而明清时代的工业化就卡在这一环节上,而渐显落后。

尤其是这些工业大量布局于大陆深处的西北弧面,在一定程度上逆转了中唐以来日益严重的经济重心失衡局面,这是今天以至未来长时期内恢复国家经济布局平衡之基础。此为中国工业化第一轮突破。

第二轮突破在中美建交后。中美联手,致苏联崩溃,中国免去北顾之忧,侧重发展东南沿海,这就回到了明清时代的工业化模式:工业化以家户为基本单位分散在乡村,以海洋为通道借重欧美海洋国家之技术和市场。

当然,第一轮工业化成果又可提供一定机器和知识支持,消费品工业得以在机制最为灵活的乡镇层面迅速发展。此为中国工业化第二轮突破,相对于第一轮,实际上在技术上降级了,但大量吸纳劳动力,大幅度改善民生。

第三轮突破始于新世纪之初。传统政府观念开始发挥作用,本来热衷于继续革命的强政府,将其能力用于建设基础设施,辅导产业发展。于是,工业产值持续增长,并沿产业链向上攀爬,终于形成全球规模最大、体系最完整的制造业部门,世界经济版图因此而大变。

今日中国已在工业化第四轮突破中,美国人因此而恐惧,从而改变了两国关系的基调,世界秩序进入大调整期。

总之,世界历史第二阶段两百年间历史的枢轴是中西位置的反转:十九世纪初期以降的一百多年,西方向上走,中国往下走;二战以后,中国向上走,西方往下走。今日似已逼近双方移位之临界点,逐渐突破世界旧秩序的容纳力。

美国民粹化,世界旧秩序崩溃

世界旧秩序正在崩溃中。其源在中国的兴起,既有世界秩序架构难以容纳;但导火索则是冷战后美国一家独大及其无法承受成本之后的仓皇失措。

历史上,罗马的力量不能及于印度,更无法越过葱岭;在另一方向上,汉唐的力量即便勉强越过葱岭,也难保持。故世界保持基本秩序的结构性条件是,不由单一中心统治。

工业化之后交通和战争技术的提升亦未改变这一铁律:二战以前,西方列强散布世界各地,相互争夺,看似混乱,实则分担全球统治成本,西方作为整体反而可对世界实施有效统治。二战后,苏联兴起,与西方形成冷战格局。两个阵营各有其经营范围,同样有效维护了世界秩序。

冷战结束,世界进入一霸独强的格局。美国在西方文明中立国最晚,也是西方人发现的最后的“新大陆”,其人口最多,注定成为西方文明统治世界之最后一站。

它确实得到了这个机会,也曾信心十足地宣称历史已经终结。然而,雄心绕不过成本的硬约束,当美国一家统治,世界秩序立刻走向松动、溃散,所谓“美国治下的和平”(Pax Americana)短暂得不足以写入未来的世界史。

回顾历史即可发现,美国之崛起大部分因为其远在世界岛外的地缘优势:列强争夺世界岛控制权,接连引爆一战、二战,美国在列强残破时介入而侥幸取胜。此后,西方列强实力丧尽、精神崩溃,不得不把西方文明的“家父权”交给美国,并从各个方面积极配合美国对抗苏联阵营。

即便如此,在朝鲜半岛上,美国拼凑的所谓“联合国军”与国力贫弱的中国直接交手,亦无力取胜。所谓美国世纪的历史证明,其实在没有直接统治世界岛的能力,只能实施离岸平衡,如同当年英国平衡欧陆。只要世界岛上诸强相安,不给其操纵机会,其统治力散布全世界,必耗散至于虚脱。

此即当下美国之困境所在,面对独家维护世界秩序的责任,美国人力不从心,在小布什、克林顿短暂的历史终结快感后,奥巴马时代即开始战略收缩,逐个抛弃其统治全球的重负:抛弃非洲,对南美心不在焉;在重返中东还是亚太再平衡之间摇摆不定。

全球统治权的短暂荣耀也诱发其内溃:美国发展出在全球范围内配置资本的金融体系,由此收获不少帝国统治红利。但“福兮祸之所倚”,金融业与其所豢养的全球性快钱行业,即以网络和医药为主的所谓高科技产业畸形繁荣,带来“去工业化”,其所培育的中下阶层生计大受影响。

受制于中国等新兴国家的自保措施,此金融体系又无法有效榨取全部帝国红利,外部收益不足以填补国内去工业化各阶层的损失。结果,美国内部的收入分配结构趋于两极化,阶层、集团间的撕裂、对立日益严重。

尤其严重的是,其国家主体族群白人清教徒比例快速萎缩,焦虑心态使其政治行为日益激进,如茶党兴起、支持特朗普,对非主流人群和外部世界的敌意持续强化;而这必将刺激非主流人群的激进化,很快就会有民主党的特朗普出现。

去工业化是美国危机的根源。西方列强之所以在十九世纪可横行全球,包括欺辱中国,主要因为其有强大工业体系所生产之坚船利炮。去工业化意味着其坚船利炮的供应不足,即便在美国,其军事工业体系也已残缺,或由于配套不全而成本过高,以至于完全无力投入另一场军备竞赛中。

美国精英已意识到此问题之严重性,奥巴马有心推动再工业化,但在“否决政治”僵局中无任何进展。特朗普应运而生,解决此问题的愿望更为急迫,“让美国再次强大”首先就是让美国再次成为第一工业国。为此,特朗普的施政风格打破成例,别创一格。

但特朗普能实现其意图否?很难。只要金融等“末业”依然可借全球体系从外部获取高额利润,资本就不可能转入国内工业和基础设施。美国欲复兴其工业,得像汉武帝那样,先摧破金融豪强,但这可能吗?

与美国的去工业化相反,中国依托坚实的全产业链基础,稳步推进其工业化第四轮突破,攀升制造业顶端。美国人终究是相信硬力量的,而中国的力量即将压倒美国。美国精英不能不产生恐惧之情,乃宣布中国为“对手”,中国关系的性质由之大变。

长期以来,在西方列强中,美国人对中国似有特殊好感,颇多怜悯之心,有时颇为慷慨。这可能源于其神教福音派心态:他们相信自己在山巅之城,有责任传播神的真理,而中国是世界上最大的国家,中国人看起来文明、温顺,或可顺受其信仰和价值。当初美国的G2提议也是让中国担当其统治世界的服帖助手。显然,此期待出于其一神教的傲慢与对历史的无知。

中国是人类文明两大类型之一,几千年都在走自己的路,即便在其最艰难时刻,即便在其全力学习苏联、西方之术时,仍保有文明自觉,未脱出其道。今天经济上的成功以及由此而有的重整世界秩序的牛刀小试,只是历史恢复其常态而已。

但缺乏历史感的美国人无法接受这一点,对中国的怜悯之情一转而为怨恨之意,一如传教者遭遇拒绝皈依者的反应。大体可以确认,美国精英群体对中国的好感已流失殆尽,怨恨中国已成共识——还有恐惧。故美国将会运用一切手段扰乱中国的发展和影响力扩大。

当然,美国的做法让正在恢复其力量和自信的中国坚定了摆脱美国体系的决心。可以确信:未来中美之间将以斗争为主。

由此,世界旧秩序的根基已经摇动:“美国治下的和平”意味着美国容许中国在其所维护的体系中发展,现在美国已不欲容纳中国,则中国不能不另起炉灶,自行建立世界新秩序。美国人宣布,其国家战略重归于应对“大国竞争”——说对了。

尽管如此,两国的历史和经验将使此斗争不成为毁灭性的。首先,在地理上,两国相隔过于辽远;其次,就国家结构而言,美国为海洋国家,长于离岸平衡,无力深入大陆;中国是海陆复合型国家,战略纵深极大。

这两个因素让美国无力对中国发动全面战争;即便其在西太发动海战,亦无胜算。

第三,就国性而言,美国的底色是“商业共和国”,基于成本收益计算行动;中国则有处理蛮夷戎狄问题的丰富经验。这些决定了两国间直接决战完全可以避免。

就此而言,中美易位,大大不同于过去几百年发生在欧洲大陆的霸权易位。狭窄的欧洲确不能兼容二主,但宽阔的太平洋却完全可以。这构成两国关系的底线。

故中美两国将会展开全方位的大国竞争,而只要中国的经济和军事力量持续提升,并在具体问题上充分展示自己有动用使用这些毁灭性力量的坚定决心,美国将会如其原宗主国英国一样,在恰当的时间,在其无力立足的地方理性退却。

直白而言,美国将会在中国的挤压下,从东亚、西太退出,那将是世界新秩序告成之时。

这几年来,中国之所为已使美国部分收效,部分美国人已认识到中国的力量和决心,并调整战略,转而对盟国下手,在同盟体系上开源节流。

这正是川普上任以来对盟国之所为:为美国短暂利益,川普毫不犹豫地退出、破坏其自二战以来所建立的联盟体系,反复要求盟国分担其维护秩序的成本,进而对其盟国提出“公平贸易”的要求。

世间本无所谓基于共同价值的“民主联盟”,美国建立联盟体系之目的从来是为了追求自己的利益,只不过借助盟友应对强大的敌人,但维护同盟是需要成本的。一旦同盟的成本大于收益,联盟体系即走向解体。

由此,西方将被打回原形,重回二战之前的状态,而且更糟糕:这一次,不是为争夺殖民地、瓜分世界,而是为了本国的生存。因而,西方世界有可能退回早期现代列国争雄状态,尽管未必通过热战。

美国为获利而不择手段,致其价值体系迅速崩溃。自威尔逊带领美国走上世界体系领导者的地位始,价值观成为美国感召力之渊薮:当年威尔逊曾感动过无数中国知识分子,尽管很快就幻灭;今天在中国,美国的普世价值神话在相当比例中国精英中仍有感召力,但川普让其一一现形。美国回到其进行殖民征服、开发西部的鄙陋状态。

美国的思想力也明显不济。当然,美国人本无深刻思想,惟欧洲两次大战迫使众多思想者流亡美国,在美国发展出若干思想。

但冷战结束后,其人纷纷离世,此后在所谓历史终结的二十年中,美国与西方未再涌现卓越的思想人物;以至于面对当下困境,其应对策略无非是翻出过去的方案或重新组合,日显鄙陋——川普及其支持者最为典型。

对此鄙陋,有人作震惊状,但这本是美国传统:清教徒为建立所谓山巅之城,消灭了印第安人;为美国制定所谓自由宪法的立国者中颇多奴隶主,并把奴隶制堂皇写入宪法;《联邦党人文集》为了保障自由设计了复杂的分权制度,但论及国家间战争和贸易则冷酷无情;美国人迷信持枪权,为自由赋予每人以杀人权。

所以,川普没有发明美国,只是让其隐而不彰的“商业共和国”传统再度显明,这是汉密尔顿当初对美国的定性,而在西方,商人经常同时是劫掠者、海盗。

上任不到两年,特朗普已带领美国大体完成其面孔转换:快速褪去涂抹在其外表的理想主义光彩,从所谓的“价值共和国”转为货真价实的“商业共和国”。这个美国不准备继续承担维护世界秩序的责任,“美国优先”口号清楚表明这一点——而此孤立主义、也即赤裸裸的利己主义同样在美国传统中。

或许可以说,内外情形使得美国政治和民情正在民粹化和法西斯化的下坡路上狂奔,特朗普不过踩了几脚油门而已。

法西斯主义产生的前提是本来处在中间的诸阶层在复杂难测的全球化网络遭受损害而陷于绝望,煽动者冲破政治建制,刻意秉持反智姿态,直接诉诸“人民”,承诺抛开一切成规,作出超人的雄姿拯救“人民”。

还有,反复指控前任的愚蠢懦弱,用幼稚的词汇描述国际关系,把内部分配不公解释为外部对本国的掠夺,不惜与全世界为敌,情绪化地抛弃盟约。此即法西斯主义之构成要素,今日美国不已几乎全部具备?

回顾历史即可发现,美国立国与德国纳粹成立之根本价值,只有一纸之隔:“美国例外论”近似于德国纳粹的“雅利安种族优越论”,这是美国法西斯化之精神根基。

特朗普是美国法西斯化之始作俑者,其他政客在震惊之余,见其获得越来越多支持,大众政治的机制必将诱导其群起效仿,法西斯化程度将日益加深。

只是由于美国规模远大于当年的德国、意大利,内部族群也较为多元,故其法西斯化或许难以席卷全国,而很可能致其溃解。

世界秩序由强国维系。几个主要角色中,欧盟的进一步凝聚已不可能,将日益碎片化;俄罗斯将持续衰落,日益成为原材料出口国;美国已无意、也无力支撑战后全球各领域多边体系和同盟,转向重建双边体系,以最大化其具体利益。而在原来的体系中并不居于中心的中国,却正在快速壮大。

可见,二战后形成的世界秩序,或者说,两百年来的世界秩序,已走向崩解,问题只在于崩解速度有多快,替代的新秩序是什么,能否及时涌现、起效以免出现大范围的严重失序。

中国重构世界秩序

在旧秩序解体的同时,世界新秩序已在酝酿中,主要的生成性力量是经济总量已居第二、而文明类型不同的中国。

此系“天降大任于斯人也”,无可推脱。对世界日趋失序,列国中最不能无视者,中国也;因为世界果真失序,中国将是最大受害者,上升之路将止步,且未来治理世界的成本将大增。总有人说中国应继续韬光养晦,此乃刻舟求剑耳。

《中庸》曰:“君子之中庸也,君子而时中。”明乎中庸之道者,当止则止,当行则行。韬光养晦者,时也;起而重整秩序,时也。不知时者,不足与论国事。

今世惟有中国有重整新秩序之能力。一方面,中国是世界上最大的国家,更在其悠久中有治理世界的充分经验:以中国之大而多样,本身就是天下或曰世界秩序;中国曾建立从中亚到南洋、横跨陆海的天下秩序,此经验在世界历史上是罕见的。

另一方面,中国也是现代的。西人塑造世界秩序,凭其现代力量,而过去一百年间,中国循西方逻辑变法。而中国之所以成功,因为西方的现代观念和制度至少部分地渊源于中国,中国内在于现代性中。

由此可以理解一个引人注目的事实:环顾全球,惟有东亚儒家文化圈各国完成了工业化,比较顺利地建立类似于西方的现代治理体系。

因此,中国正在塑造的世界新秩序不是全新的,因为两者在现代性上是相通的,可保持连续性。

当然,西方接受中国思想必加以西方化,故多有偏而不正之处。中国塑造新世界秩序可对其予以矫正,综合运用古典、现代智慧,矫正现有世界秩序之偏失,其大义有三:

第一,恢复全球均衡发展。

世界岛上展开的古典秩序偏于大陆一端;西方列强普遍为海洋国家,其所主导的世界秩序偏于海洋一端,由此导致世界岛逐渐塌陷,昔日文明中心反成世界祸乱之源。

美国治下的和平未能解决这一问题,其孤悬世界岛外,惯于离岸平衡,不能深入内陆,没有与文明传统深厚之各国打交道的经验。

故其只能维护海洋秩序,不能维护世界秩序,甚至经常因为无知,贸然闯入世界岛中央,以粗暴手法操作;引发混乱之后,又束手无策,迅速撤离,世界之腹心乃长期处在溃疡、溃烂、失血状态。

中国塑造新世界秩序,必当执两用中。中国自古即在陆海之际,兼顾海陆,最为均衡:汉唐中国积累了交往陆上文明的经验,宋明以来中国深入海洋贸易体系。

正是据此历史经验,当代中国提出“一带一路”倡议,其最大优点在于涵摄世界岛和海洋,包容旧世界和新世界:“一带”旨在恢复世界岛秩序,“一路”旨在安顿海洋秩序。

这是人类提出的第一个完整的、均衡的世界秩序方案,中国已为此建立相应机制:上合组织初步形成解决世界岛问题的架构,若纳入德国,即告完备。至于安顿海洋秩序,不必建立专门组织,毕竟,美国的核心影响在海洋上,中国可与之协调海洋秩序。

第二,驯化资本主义,倡导厚生主义。

西方赖以强富强的体制为“资本主义”,扎根于西方海盗-商人传统和殖民征服传统,以获取货币利润为驱动力,以畸形发达的金融体系经营资本,以贸易为枢纽。对待他者,以离岸手法操作,以猎获廉价资源或市场为枢纽。它可以占有世界,却不能耕作世界,机会主义倾向严重。

西人将资本主义推到全世界,但在没有殖民红利的国家,这套制度是自相矛盾的,无从正常运作。故自十九世纪西方统治世界以来,西方以外实现工业化、现代化的国家,除儒家文化圈外几乎没有,这一事实表明,资本主义不是普世的。

中国圣贤所立经济社会模式,用孙中山先生的词说是“民生主义”,或可谓之“厚生主义”。其大纲为《尚书•大禹谟》“正德、利用、厚生、惟和”,重视“开物”、“利用”,也即重视物质的生产、利用和分配,以让人改进生活,且生生不已。

为此采取“崇本抑末”政策,以使商业、金融活动服务于生产和民生。中国已初步应用这一模式于世界,“一带一路”倡议中的经济方略与此前西方国家有很大不同,重视授人以渔,改善基础设施,推动工业化。

中国目前是世界工厂,产业正在升级,未来将重构世界分工体系:向上,接纳西方国家尖端制造业提供的部件,向下,梯次转移普通制造业到不发达国家,主要是非洲。

随着中国成为全球最大消费市场,比较均衡地在发达国家和不发达国家之间分配这个市场,此即传统“朝贡贸易”之要旨所在;比较均衡地从全世界不同地区获得能源;在世界范围内倡导崇本抑末政策。

第三,走向“一体多元”的世界格局。

欧洲列强建立世界秩序,普遍求“同”,倾向使用暴力,必定制造敌人。美国受其清教影响,热衷于价值一律,以普世价值强加世界一致,凡与自己观念不同者概斥为“邪恶”,视为敌人。

故当福山高谈历史终结时,导弹正横飞于中东。西方文明以求同始,以撕裂终,根本无从建立普遍秩序。至于作为其反弹的文化多元主义,已致西方各国内部撕裂、解体,遑论世界秩序。

中国则不同,《尚书•尧典》描述尧舜缔造中国和天下之道曰:“克明俊德,以亲九族。九族既睦,平章百姓。百姓昭明,协和万邦。”

几千年来,中国人以“一个天、多个神,诸神统于天”或以“一个文教,多种神教”为本,吸纳多元宗教、族群,而以敬天或文教一体之,从而构建“一体多元”的国家和天下格局,这是唯一可行的通往普遍秩序之道。

此秩序之构建不是通过暴力征服,也不通过传教或推行普世价值让他者变成自己,而是承认他者的自主,“修文德以来之,既来之,则安之”[6]。大体上,今天中国就是循此和而不同之道建立和维护国际组织,滋长世界新秩序,也即天下秩序。

依据圣人“协和万邦”以平天下之道,可推定中国引领生成天下秩序的方式和基本特征如下:

第一,天下秩序不是一次性构建的而是渐进生成的。“周虽旧邦,其命维新”,可用以描述中国引领形成新秩序的程序:周本为旧邦,长期行德化,首先影响周边邦国,逐渐扩大其影响力,到文王三分天下有其二,诸侯归于周而不归殷,乃有殷周之易位。中国人重整天下秩序亦将循此渐进之道,而避免与现有霸权对撞。

第二,维系正在形成的天下体系,以德礼为先。天下体系只是“协和万邦”,而非建立紧密联盟,更非强求同质化。

维系各国关系的首先是德、礼,“修文德以来之”,此文德包括道义,更包括经济惠泽;同时,协同各国建立礼治。礼治区别于现有国际法体系之处在于,除明晰各主体之权利、义务,还强调互亲敦睦,建立情感纽带。

第三,天下秩序不求覆盖全世界。世界太大,任何单一国家均无力有效治理。圣人深明此义,故天下体系从未试图覆盖当时所知全世界,后世亦然:郑和下西洋遭遇众多邦国,但天子未殖民征服之,亦未将其全部纳入朝贡体系,而让其自主抉择。

中国人不追求所有国家立刻进入同一体系,天下秩序是没有终点的历史过程。只要台湾统一、美国退出东亚、西太,对中国人而言,世界新秩序即告成型。中国如此节制,可避免鱼死网破的霸权之争。

第四,完整的世界新秩序将存在两三个区域性体系。中国是海陆复合型国家,可运用其传统智慧,领导西太、大半个世界岛、非洲等区域为天下体系,美国等有共同耶教信仰的大西洋海洋国家将别成其普遍世界体系,世界岛中央则可有伊斯兰世界秩序。这样,以其固有文明为本,未来世界可有2.5个区域性体系。

此类似于亨廷顿的文明划分,但未必是文明冲突。亨廷顿以西人神教思维看待世界,不了解中国文明。

随着中国影响力日益增长,可在塑造世界新秩序过程中发挥更大作用,则可以其智慧,避免与其他两个体系陷入对抗,且缓解另两个体系之对抗。

现实可能性在于,中国是海陆复合型国家,与另1.5个体系有价值和利益高度重叠之处,可作跨体系的“协和”。“中国”可以成为居于区域性体系之中的协和之国,从而形成多元一体的世界新秩序。

为此,中国可逐渐构建逐层嵌套、由内而外的复合的世界治理架构:

最内层,重建东亚秩序。传统上,朝鲜半岛、越南为中国最亲近的藩属,日本也深受影响。

二战后,东亚儒家文化圈成为全球唯一成片完成现代化者,但其间关系破碎,听命外人,与其经济的发达繁荣形成鲜明对比。原因是中国贫弱,无力发挥主导作用,听任美国、苏联等外部力量操纵。

中国整顿世界秩序,必由此开始,且其目标超越国际关系,而是带领韩朝、新、越、日等国,依托共同的儒家文化传统,逐渐恢复儒家式治理体系,协调采取民生主义政策,为全世界树立全新的繁荣、文明标准,如同此前西方各国为全世界标杆。

随着中国力量增强,美国不能不逐渐退出,这一进程将以出人意料的高速展开。

中间层以“上合组织”为依托,安顿世界岛中央秩序。该组织已吸纳印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗,进一步可吸纳土耳其、德国。

俄罗斯的经济缺乏潜力,其全球影响力将持续衰减,将收缩于中亚及其周边,故将日益重视上合组织,可协与中国共同协和伊斯兰世界各国,化解世界岛上诸古典文明各国之间的紧张,避免冲突,进而寻求共同发展。

这是大大扩展了的“新西域”,关乎中国西部安全和繁荣;又在世界岛中央,此处稳,则全球大局不乱;由此,美国无从施展其离岸操纵术,其全球支配力自然衰退,此为尽快形成世界新秩序之关键。

最外层是制度化的一带一路倡议,涵括整个世界,“一带”以上合组织为主要治理平台,一路则以东南亚各国、非洲为重点。

尤其是非洲,人口众多,自然条件尚可,位于欧洲之南缘,介于中国、美国之间,随着中国工业体系向上升级,产能外溢,非洲是唯一可以接纳的沃土,是为构造中国主导的全球生产体系之布局关键。

至于与西方体系的协和,则可在G20平台上。

结语

人类文明大体可分两大类型,故考察世界秩序之演变和前景当以中国和西方之浮沉升降为中心。

在早期现代,西方受中国启发;一百多年前,中国学习西方;中国的复兴,导致西方主导的世界旧秩序崩溃;新秩序的生成,必以中国为中心。

五百年必有王者兴。把握这五百年的世界历史,既要理解西方现代观念和制度的优长与限度,也要理解中国文明内在的现代性质及其在现代之新生转进。

这一点,今天尤其重要。为此,需以新视野重建知识体系,以古老的中国知识消化现代西方知识,是即“中学为体,西学为用”。

《文化纵横》国际传播系列由三大洲社会研究所(Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 网站:www.thetricontinental.org)和东声(Dongsheng News,网站:www.dongshengnews.org)协作翻译并制作,有英语、西语、葡语三个版本。每期根据不同主题,从《文化纵横》杂志过往发表文章中,选择3-5篇文章进行编译,预计每季度发布一期。2023年第1期主题为“重构现代世界体系”,主要分析全球紧张局势加剧背景下的俄乌战争的全球影响,追溯中西关系的历史轨迹,并探讨团结广大第三世界国家、推动构建新型国际体系的可能性。